tv Potential Global Crises in 2014 CSPAN January 13, 2014 2:50am-4:21am EST
original contribution is being lost. >> thank you. >> if i can just add, my personal knowledge of the two main parties here is the threat to cut off our assistance, our development assistance. it's not what's going to motivate them to come to the table and get the ceasefire done, arrive at an interim political assessment. it will hurt the people of south sudan. we know how to do it in the midst of conflict. we have many modalities for how to provide assistance, either with the cooperation of the government or working through other avenues, local and international partners and sub national levels of government. there are stable areas of the country. we should not stop development assistance in the stable areas of the country. it's very important to help keep the conflict from spreading and to not lose the gains we've already made. as well, united states assistance has been vital with the economy with the central
bank of south sudan, picking up the pieces economically when this is all done will be much, much harder if we pull that support out now. so i do think that it's important and imperative that development assistance continue. that the modalities be examined. that the strategies be updated as the situation changes. but that we keep the commitment to the people of south sudan and not harm them further. >> and one last point. the building leverage is critical. that's what we've got to be looking for all the time. the aid doesn't -- i agree. the aid doesn't make a big difference to these guys. but it does make a big difference to the people of south sudan and to the building of institutions in the long run. pulling that away now would really undermine the long-term stability of the place. our leverage i think should focus on individual culpability. the targeting sanctions, prosecution of people who are found to be committing or planning atrocities and patterns of atrocities. the additional leverage comes if we work much more closely and
transpare transparently. collectively pressure the parties when there are key point moments that there needs to be a push. again, i just view a very high level white house to state house in beijing engagement in south sudan to be a critical thing to do right now in order to show that united front internationally to the parties that we're really going to be pushing for peace, and those that undermine peace are going to have some kind of particular sanction. >> is it your assessment that china is willing to step up to the plate in that regard? >> not as publicly as us. but their interests are much deeper in terms of national security than ours are, and so let's figure out -- and i think that the good news is that our interests in terms of what the end game is line up very clearly
with china. so let's take advantage of that moment. it doesn't happen off globally and figure out how we can more deeply work with them. >> thank you. >> thank you. one last question on that issue that mr. pendergast mentioned about looking for leverage and targeting sanctions of those human rights violations, since you've been intimately involved until very krecently. do you view that as among others a good leverage point? >> i think it's going to be extremely important in another way. i think personally in the process over the next few years of writing a new constitution and laying a new foundation, that that creates the basis for eliminating from future power a lot of people who are responsible, so whether it's in the process of prosecution or
some other kind of commission, a lot of people who are very guilty of the kind of terrible violations should not be part of a new government after 2015. and i think that is one of the outcomes that we should see. >> well, with the thanks of the committee for your invaluable testimony, i expect that the african subcommittee as well as the full committee will lend continuing attention to the challenges in south sudan, and the leaders on all sides need to recognize that reality, not a singular hearing at a >> we will look at economic in equality. easternstart at 9:00
with a live coverage on c-span 2. also monday at the brookings institution, paul ryan. his remarks at 4:00 eastern on c-span 3. >>, gob, a discussion about potential global press had this year and including syria. that's coming up, a discussion threatstential global this year including syria. later, washington journal with your calls and the headlines. a look at potential threat from a report by the council on foreign relations including the syrian civil war, violence in afghanistan, and north korea nuclear program are some the top priorities.
this runs about one hour and a half. >> let me remind everybody that this meeting is on the record. we want to do this efficiently and let you know that the video and audio will be available on the website. it is my pleasure to introduce the panelists. you have their complete bios on the roster for today's meeting.
let me introduce them officially for those people who are watching via videotape. dr. david gordon, who has had a distinguished career. he served as chairman of the national intelligence council and director of policy planning at the state department to read department. thes head of research at eurasia group. have just released a report. i believe you can find the eurasia report at eurasia.net. every time i'm with david here,
i have to say -- he was my senior thesis advisor when i was undergraduate and i am deeply indebted for him to inspire me to this career. i hope i have made you proud. >> yes, you have. >> to my right is mark schneider. mark has held numerous positions in government. deputy secretary of state and state department chief of the office of analysis and future planning. he has been at the international crisis group for 13 years. he is quite a veteran of these issues. finally, we have the senior fellow for conflict prevention. he has held senior positions at the u.s. institute of peace, stanford university, and the brookings institution. he has written or edited 10 books on world affairs.
are we going to go left to right? left to right. dr. gordon. >> thank you very much. it is a great pleasure to be here. it is great to have a good discussion about what is going to happen in the coming year. let me start with some of the themes at the global, macrolevel. we'll work down to more specifics. as we look at the world in 2014, the striking thing is that the set of issues that dominated global macro concerns since the financial crisis has begun to retreat. the risks of another round of
really bad financial instability and that has been the focus of a lot of what we have done analytically since 2008. that's retreated. take on a different characteristic, not a financial risk per se, but much more of a divergence and the end of emerging markets as any kind of a unified asset class. um, but at the geopolitical level, at the geopolitical level that's really where we see all sorts of uncertainty here. and our top risk for the year really has to do with america's troubled alliances. and i think that 2013 was a year that set in motion some very,
very, very powerful forces that serve to weaken the perception of commitment by the united states in the eyes of american allies around the world. and i think that the two main events here -- one was really an event, the other was a slow rolling out. but i think the first was the snowden affair and the whole set of consequences around the affair itself, but also the uncertainty with which the administration has dealt with what happened with snowden. are they backing nsa? are they not backing nsa? what's important here, what's not. the lack of a strategic response by the administration.
and i think in particular this is really -- this has really put a huge risk on what had been a growing relationship between the u.s. government and high-tech firms on cybersecurity issues, on counterterrorism issues, that that was mutually beneficial, but the, i think the trust factor there is gone in the part of the private sector. i gave a speech two weeks ago just before the holidays to a group of silicon valley ceos, and the animosity, the an moss the city towards the obama -- animosity towards the obama administration on the handling of these issues was absolutely stunning to me. second, i think, the second driver here was the vacillation
around syria. and, again, it's less of an outcome. it's less of what happened p in syria and more about the process of setting up red lines, driving what looked like a runup to a military action. and, again, the lack of consultation with allies and the lack of a strategic focus here. what was the president trying to do. and i think when allies, frankly, hear president obama talk about syria as a foreign policy success, they wince. they wince. so, you know, for a lot of relationships here these things are thorns, right? for canada, for the u.k., even
for japan a little more serious. but for a lot of other allies, for, you know, particularly u.s. alliances this the middle east -- in the middle east, if for a lot of countries in asia, in the pacific they really raise questions on the reliability and the durability of security guarantees. and where is is this all, where is this all headed? so this uncertainty about the role, what's the obama administration's strategy, what are its priorities? i think this was reinforced, frankly, on the trade side with all of the buildup around the trans-pacific partnership and closing the trans-pacific partnership. and, again, the administration sort of saying, well, it's the congress' role to get trade
promotion authority which flies in the face of all of the prior experience where administrations have gone and made requests and made compelling cases. i worked on the hill when we did the u.s./canada/mexico. and, you know, president clinton set up a war room in the white house around this. that's how you get big trade bills passed. there's been nothing of this. so i think that, that's the first. the second theme here if it's u.s. external and uncertainty, i think the second big driver is china internal. and it's really driven by the fact that the new, the new chinese leadership, the new chinese leadership is very focused on reforming domestically, getting china to a more stand bl economic -- sustainable economic policy. this is something that as a
close observer of chinese economic policy for 20 year, it's stunning to me that in the last ten years for all of the talk about reform and the significance of reform be, there was less and less and less big reform. and the new leadership clear hi of the view that time is not on their side, that unless they move quickly, they will not make the series of reforms that they need. but the reform process itself potentially very destabilizing. lots of losers. and the political strategy that the chinese leadership has chosen to undertake this is recentralization and strengthening the core leadership of the communist party and undertaking a very, very, very sharp anti-corruption campaign and setting up control mechanisms here, strengthening control mechanisms. so the irony of this is that
it's undertaking a liberalizing economic policy through leninist means. and, you know, is that going to work? is we don't know. if it opportunity work, if it doesn't work, this will be a huge source of instability over the coming years. and i think president obama in his meeting with chinese president xi jinping was absolutely correct when he said that the united states has a huge stake in china successfully enabling these reforms. third big theme globally was the reemergence of al-qaeda from its, from the series of setbacks that it suffered cull -- culminating in the killing of usama bin laden. and here again i think the core
geography here was syria and, in retrospect, syria and the whole syrian conflict is looking increasingly like afghanistan in the '80s and iraq in the last decade in terms of being a magnet for jihadists and a focal point for increasing extremism. now, the new form of al-qaeda is somewhat different from original al-qaeda, that, in fact, the defining characteristic of al-qaeda as an organization driven by usama bin laden was the focus on the far enemy. and jihaddism in al-qaeda 2.0 has gone local. the al-qaeda brand is the brand, but it's now very much a finish it's all about local power, it's all about building local alliances. in many ways al-qaeda 2.0 has more in common as an organization with hezbollah than it does with al-qaeda,
original add al qaeda. and so those are the big, those are the big macro themes. i want to close by focusing on the two regions that are of big concern and drawing a contrast between them. i think you have a lot of geopolitical risk and tension both in the greater middle east and in asia and in the pacific. ..
whereas in the middle east i think it both a lack of interdependence and you have a lack of any kind of a credible security energy. i think there still is a security guarantee for the gulf, for the straits, but the saudis, the others do not believe that, they have a whole conspiratorial view about iran and iranian relations. the middle east has not come close to hitting bottom yet. and that i think 2014, we are already seeing a refocusing of jihadists pressures into iraq. i think that will continue. lebanon is on a very, very, very
fragile tilt. this also spreads out into turkey. and so i think the middle east region is one where extraordinarily concerned about. i just wanted to throw these ideas out there as a big themes we can come back and talk about a lot more specific in the key with a. thank you very, very much. >> mark, your turn. >> thanks a lot. thanks to give me the opportunity to participate in what really is the third joint look at the dangers pressing against our living room windows. in the new year. and thank david s. always resetting the strategic framework within which i'm going to focus on countries. 2014 is going to be a very hard year for those who make or conduct foreign policy in the obama administration. also for the u.n. it will be another year, great response of those, fewer resources to meet the challenges and inevitably
more criticism for failing to prevent or bring complex to an end. and in addition we shouldn't forget this. most of the people in the countries where discussing it will be another year of misery, senseless violence, anger towards the west for failing to come to their aid, particularly anger at the united states. crisis group president op-ed next years -- was published for the fourth year in a row you want to emphasize the criteria that we used was for including some and excluding others, and it's open to dispute was that these complex are where we have the greatest concern about the magnitude of the loss of life. in 2014, if they explode. or with respect to ongoing conflicts, same concerns given the likelihood of increased intensity of this complex in the coming year, and where the capabilities or willingness of national forces, national political forces, or the
international community, to mitigate those dangers is lacking. now, last year i cited some issues that i thought cut across the various countries, and i still think those are relevant. first the absence of the rule of law partially applied to protect citizens. second, the inability of the state to ensure monopoly on the use of force, to protect the borders, enforce the law or protect its citizens. third, it seems to me that we now have, and david touched on it, we have radical islamist extremist bring tears -- [inaudible] and essentially taking advantage of those internal battles for their own hand. forth, again, applied the continuing absence of neatly packaged peace agreement in civil conflict for all the parties are at the table and all commit to the end to implementing those agreements. that simply does not exist. and, finally, effect i empathize
last you that want to emphasize begin this year, none of these complex are contained within the borders of the named country. they all believe across borders, destabilize their neighbors and in many instances, their neighbors contribute to the continuation of those conflicts. now, i'm not going to limit myself to the tender juicy in this list. one, i'm going to emphasize is that afghanistan, giving the immediate short-term potential for extends of violence innovative elections in april next year. clearly poses the threat of additional violence. and even more so if the elections replicate the election of 2005. but let me make a point that there are several which dropped off last year's list and to some degree there's positive reasons for that. kenya dropped off last year's list in part because regional and international diplomatic engagement in the run up to the recent election helped prevent the kind of ethnic cleansing
that essentially cut the country apart six years ago. second, pakistan didn't make the list this year because it successfully managed its first transition from one elected civilian government to another. and also because the new military chief seems to have shown some evidence of are willing to go after the pakistani jihadists and also to allow new our charisse efforts to build engagement with india to continue. third, turkey dropped off the list as they seem to be holding cease-fire. and forth, the drc, extremely fragile, nevertheless the diplomatic strategy that was put together by mary robinson at the u.n. plus feingold and lady ashton, in fact have managed to regional parties, put pressure on them in ways -- at very least dampen down the proxy
confrontation and along with a more progressive military posture of monusco basically has taken down the in 23 and hopefully put controls on the other militias in eastern congo. there are however five new countries. that pose greater risk this year of widespread loss of life in 2014. central africa republic. a number of displaced has grown from 180,000 in june to 400,000 in november, and a month later when i testified before the congress, 600,000 there today, a million. simply the fact that even with the intervention of the african union peacekeeping, the killing continues between christians and muslims, and the power struggle has not been handed. second, i think we also have to focus on the reality that libya in this 2014 has the potential
for additional violence across the border the militias roaming the country. the islamist, liberal conservative revolutionary center periphery divide. bangladesh, the competition because back to the 1971 war of liberation. as you saw the elections on sunday, 22% turnout, substantial violence. unfortunately, that looks like it's going to continue. honduras, murder capital of the world. transnational cartels via gangs to participate in the illicit transport of drugs. 87% of all the cocaine coming to the united states by air goes through honduras. the north caucasus, this year the olympics in sochi unfortunately more than -- are coming to sochi. and, in fact, the state security structure doesn't make much distinction between who are the
real victims and who are the real threats. to the other five conflicts on our list, those are the new ones. that is, the new ones are central african republic, libya -- the continuing ones are because the intensity has, in fact, increased. south sudan and sudan. in both countries, each faces multiple points of political violence. and, unfortunately, with unresolved issues that go back many years. and have not been resolved by the secession in south sudan. the explosions in recent week in south sudan has already been to atrocities unfortunately the troops are still aiming for juba and despite discussions, the unresolved political competition threaten the future of the country. in the north, the failed to design a comprehensive strategy
to deal with the underlying separatists, autonomy concerns of region and to bring them somewhere into national government, set a new powder keg for the north itself. and then david has already indicated syria. it's internal conflict is no closer to resolution, and over the course of last year, the death toll reached 200,000. it has virtually engulfed lebanon. it's not just syria. it's its impact in the region. lebanon's population has been swollen by 25% by syrian refugees. and that obviously has a skewed lebanon's own sectarian balance. unfortunately as well, despite the resolving chemical weapons issue, the one hope for any the fundamental conflict rests on the u.s.-russian accord is
slimmer than ever. for those internal optimist, there's a glimmer somewhere that the iranian nuclear or limit their report might need to lead to a positive iranian role in geneva. you have to really dig deep to believe that's going to make a difference. iraq is not in a full-blown civil conflict. more than 8000 deaths in 2013, increase prospects over the coming year. the molecule government simply did not and is now suffering the consequences of sure start exclusion of sunni leadership, from government anticipate and service. it's also grappling with the negative impact of the syrian conflict. they may appear to be quiet because nothing else push them off the front pages but the real is that mali and northern nigeria remain tinderbox. the final country on our list is
central asia. it's not the country, it's a subregion. it was on last year and it's on this year. everyone other countries faces the possibility for a very violent transition to the family that the autocrats have controlled the country simply have not set in motion any institution that provide for a transition. and given the fact that they are all vulnerable to extremist cutting back from afghanistan and the other wars, the possibly of a major outbreak of violence there is a great concern. in conclusion, deadly conflict usually -- states inability or lack of interest in providing all other citizens basic services, due process and security. instead predatory rule that benefit the elite, ethnic and sectarian divisions and denial of human rights are the future violence and every one of these countries. >> thank you very much, mark.
poll, over to you. high-tech now i suppose. >> thanks, jim. and thank you all for coming out on this very chilly morn. really appreciate it. so i'm going to talk to you about the results of our latest revenge of priority survey. as many of you know we do this on an annual basis. the six-time we've done it, as jim said it's available on the website and they're also hard copies available on yorkshire. for most of you familiar with the survey, the basic premise is that there are many conceivable sources of political instability and conflict around the world, that the u.s. has an interest in preventing or mitigating in some respects but they are equally important in terms of the challenge they pose to u.s. interests. so the purpose of the survey is ws policy makers make choices -- u.s. policymakers make choices,
given the limited or finite resources and attention span as well as i think the appetite of the american public to engage in various preventive action overseas. so the gulf basically is to help u.s. policymakers pick and choose among the competing priorities. so before i get into the actual results of the survey this year, i thought i would just sort of quickly review how we do this through the each year. so basically we begin with initial crowd sourcing, social media outlets of the principal concerns of the foreign policy community. and so we solicit the contingencies that are going to be the basis of the survey each year. and on the basis of that we select 30 contingencies that make up the actual survey. and then we send out the instrument this year to over
1200 government officials, experts and nongovernmental officials, academics. and we basically asked them to rank each contingency on the basis of how likely they think it will be in 2014, and what is the relative impact on u.s. interests according to some basic criteria that we lay out in the survey. and on the basis of the results we get back, we audit the results into three priorities for u.s. policymakers and we do it according to this basic risk matrix, as you can see but if you want to learn more about the methodology you can read about it in the actual survey that's on page four. so let me now runs through the basic survey results, and i'm going to use this new interactive global conflict
tractor that we've developed to not not only highlight the pbs but also serve as the basic resource for the community on conflict around the world that we have identified as being particularly important for 2014. as you can see, when you go on to the global conflict tracker you come up with a map. on the left, you can organize various conflicts by relative likelihood. on the left, the moderate low as well as relative importance to u.s. interests. again, moderate, high, medium, low. you can filter them across the map. these are the q1 contingencies. secondly tier two, and tier tier three.
and then he can go on any one of those, click on any one of these and each one will bring up a background conflict brief we are calling them. which lays out basic information about the conflict, date of late is used, major reports that are available on the particular conflict, and other resources that i think are very useful. i'm not aware of any other resources this kind out there, so we are hoping this will be of use. this will be regularly updated, by the way, so that it's not sort of one shot. so with that as sort of a gentle introduction, let me go through the tier one contingencies. which were identified this year. no great surprises. many of the tier one contingencies from last year
showed up in this year's list of top priorities. still obviously concerned about the threat of a major terrorist attack as was cyber attack on the united states. the situation with iran is hardly resolve, and there's still concern the interim agreement might unravel and lead to a resumption of tensions with iran. afghanistan is out there as mark said in terms of the likelihood of increased violence as a result of the drawdown of u.s. forces and coalition forces in general, and the uncertainty about what will happen post 2014. pakistan is still considered very unstable to most experts in terms of its internal situation. the are, as mark mentioned, some encouraging signs but over all people were still unconvinced about the long-term stability of
pakistan. i would say perhaps that leading focus of concern this year was series. this was last year's number one prevented priority, and we can demonstrate how, but this new tracker offers to the community. as you saw, we collect on the -- we clicked on the symbol for syria and it takes you to this conflict a brief. you just scroll down a little bit, you got a sense of what is available. there were not only tweets, red portion on the left inside, also give you an update on the situation in syria, a crisis alert we are calling it. but if you just scroll down a little further here, you see the latest information from around the web, breaking news, primary sources on the conflict. so again, this i think shows how
useful this will be in terms of a resource on each of these conflicts. getting back to the tier one contingencies again, i mentioned that somewhere the same from last year. we have a i think for new tier one contingencies that were upgraded from last year, strengthening of al qaeda in the arabian peninsula, and general instability in yemen was identified. north korea remains a major concern. not only about the erratic behavior of the leadership there, but the possibility of various military in the coming year whether nuclear or missile related. the growing civil violence in iraq, and a possibility for full-blown civil war also made
it into tier one this year. and, finally, spillover from the syrian conflict into jordan was also highlighted this year. let me turn now to the tier two contingencies. see them on the map there. again, some of the concerns from last year showed up in this year's survey. continuing uncertainty about egypt's political stability, nigeria, particularly northern nigeria, a possibility of a major crisis between india and pakistan. we have seen an uptick in violence in kashmir along the line of control, and also finally libya was mentioned as a concern, growing concern among many respondents. interestingly, east china sea, south china sea did not make it
into the tier one category this year, which was somewhat surprising. it could be due to the timing of the survey, which was done in november before the recent increased tensions over the territorial disputes, particularly between china and japan but it may be because of what david said at the outset of some general confidenc competene economic independence between countries in east asia and the u.s. security guarantee make people feel that, while a source of concern, while not actually become a major source of actual hot conflict, if you will. some new contingencies that made it into to tear this year, some of which have been mentioned by mark. somalia, a possibility as, with the war in somalia with
al-shabaab plays out and we could see an uptick in violence, particularly in neighboring countries as a result of terrorist attacks by al-shabaab and, of course, th the central african republic is a source of great concern to many. again, you can find out more about chr by clicking on that and going into the get the latest information. let me just quickly turn to the tier three, the third level of priorities identified this year. some dropped off, and mark again has mentioned some of these contingencies that did not appear this year. tenure, zimbabwe, and actually interesting saudi arabia. there was concern last year of the potential for political instability in saudi arabia. didn't show up this year. but we did get some new sources, concerns merger, increased
sectarian violence between buddhist and muslim in me and mark, protected internal violence -- myanmar. inadequate in many respected interestingly, tensions between india and china appeared this year, the possibility of rising tensions over there very territorial disputes may begin. and, of course, sedan as well. now, interestingly to contingencies showed up to internal instability in sudan and north south tensions. and it was not anticipated that there would be violence or internal instability within south sudan. as you see were already on top of it. we updated the conflict briefed to reflect the rising violence within south sudan. so that's about it for the pps.
i owed you -- i urge you to not only read the survey results that use our global conflict trucker. i think you'll find it very useful, and that's it. >> thank you very much, paul. the global conflict trucker can be found at cfr's website, cfr.org. i'd like to bring the rest of you into the conversation if we may. i would ask if people have questions to wait until your recognize can wait until we get a microphone. and if you could identify yourself, we would greatly appreciate it. go back to dr. walker. >> joshua walker. i was interested, the one major discrepancy that he heard between you and when he said turkey was off your list, a but
started shaking, looking at his topless. and for all of the holiday surprises we had, it almost seems pressing. i want to pressure on the tricky question there. >> so, yeah, i'm very, very, very concerned about turkey. and i'm concerned that, me, turkey is one of a bunch of countries emerging market country that has elections this year, but i think that it's also very vulnerable to the cross-border stop from syria, but my biggest concern in some ways is, i think we're heading back into the pkk kurdish question leading to a return of conflict and erdogan is just getting -- the more pressure there is the increasing, increasingly combative and conspiratorial and paranoid he gets.
and it's really self-fulfilling, and i think that as turkey moved to this new constitutional arrangement with having more power in the presidency, you are potentially setting up a huge fight within the akp. so i'm really quite concerned about turkey. i think we are heading into very, very nasty territory there. >> does erdogan run? >> yes. and i think he probably becomes president, but then this really uncertainty, the powers of the presidency, people try to prevent his main opponent in the akp from becoming prime minister. this gets very ugly. >> the reason that we, again,
choosing which countries in the list of 10 and initially is hard. but on turkey it was again that 2014, do we think there would be massive loss of life in turkey as a result of a political conflict? the answer is no. i think -- long-term stability issues, absolutely. but again, turkey still, when you look at the institutions in turkey, they are stronger. and the politics have a tendency, particularly the election politics now, i think we'll have a contingency on restraining erdogan and pushing both he and the pkk to maintain the cease-fire, at least in the short term. now, that gives them then the opportunity in in the midterm o deal with these issues and and much more -- let's say compromised way, that avoid the long-term crisis that david pointed is potential. so i hope that's right. my only issue here is that as
things begin to get shaky in turkey, this year, erdogan veers very sharply towards his nationalist-based, and go into that basis exactly, he had to move away from a commitment he had talked about, vis-à-vis, the kurds. i'm very worried about this purchase question going absolutely in the wrong direction, david. it's a good debate. we will see who was right. >> just adding quickly. we didn't identify turkey in particular as a great source of concern, but we didn't identify rising secessionists pressure amongst the kurds. we are a little us i think sanguine than igc on the deal between turkey and the pkk and vc concerned about unraveling, that agreement was largely reached before the creation of a kurdish enclave within syria.
and is also obviously the effect of the iraq civil war on the possibility of kurdistan declaring some kind of semi-autonomous stay there, too. so it often think we do see a real uptick in instability around the kurdish issue in 2014. >> fair enough. >> thank you. thank you very much for doing this. in my first comment is that it's quite different from last year. china as paul mentioned was big on the horizon. that china is nice, reforming cabinetry. this is deep contrast to my question is primarily to david. what i would say is you did not mention the fear of new imaging
market crisis. of course, turkey is one of the countries we're worried about, indonesia, india, south africa. so i wanted to ask how concerned -- summit. >> sure. i mean, hard about has to do with the focus of this session on civil conflict and implications for u.s. foreign policy. actually if you look at our document, what we call diverging markets is our number two risk. and it basically highlights the fact that the years between 2002-2012, 2013 were very good years for the emerging markets. they basically acted as an asset class.
this was very favorable for political incumbents. lots of countries i think god unrealistic, bought into this whole narrative of emerging markets as the inevitable way of the future. in 2014 has elections and a half a of the most important countries. and the outcomes are likely to be much more divergent here. so we are most pessimistic about turkey, but we are also i think a lot less optimistic than a lot of people are about india. there's been a lot of -- there's been a lot of enthusiasm over the possibility of ahead of government where he has followed a very market from the common investor from the policy. in india a bit like the united states, governing at the center
in delhi is completely different from governing at the state level. and just like american presidents who were governors, their behavior as governors didn't, don't get their signals to what they're going to do in the white house. i think the same thing is likely to hold in india. and i'm particularly struck by the fact that you had the last five years, you had a congress government, pretty strong with literally the world's leading economic technocrats in the driver's seat, and they failed to get real momentum behind reform. i think there's still a very, very big political challenge for india to move to the next level. i'm relatively more optimistic about some of the countries, people are concerned about. i think in south africa, we are beginning to see the
fragmentation of the labor unions that could be a positive factor in terms of restoring a balance between populism and constructive economic policies. i think also that brazil, heading towards reelection would give her a chance to restart, reformulate or economic team probably do a little bit more, particularly on the energy front where the brazilians are in real danger of falling behind the ways. colombia, i'm very bullish. i'm very bullish on mexico. but what our theme here is the emerging markets are much what difficult environment, and i think the whole narrative, even the international institution bought into of the emerging markets as the future is a much
more complicated story. >> just quickly on china. i mentioned that there had been i think some general skepticism the tensions between china and japan it escalate into a hot war. quite a few respondents in the survey did mention the possibility of political instability inside china as a concerned. and for those of you who did take the survey, you are actually passed to see if there are other issues not on the list, things you're being asked to rank of concern to you, please fill in the blood. and sure enough, quite a few actually did mention rising instability inside china. i don't think it was purely about ethnic tensions related to the weaker issue, but also general dissatisfaction -- uighur issue. corruption and the comments party and other concerns about governments in china.
>> will it be significant that this year is the 25th anniversary of tiananmen square? >> i think there are people here who are probably better able to comment on the. i'm not sure it's going to get so much, you know, it's going to get more attention i think outside of china than within china. i don't see it as being sort of a focal point for public dissent. i think, i think that's very unlikely. >> mark? >> two things. one is i think we've been writing about the potential, not so much for intentional conflict as result of china's effort to project power, but in terms of the south china sea, in terms of the creation of the pressure on japan, the potential for accidents has increased. and while there's likely both sides will backweight, nevertheless it's a matter of concern. >> mark, we've seen talk about
improving, virtually nonexistent crisis communications procedures in northeast asia. how's that talk translate into any significant advances to deal with this issue of -- >> not yet. in fact, one of the things we've been arguing for is that there needs to be a series of -- not single, not one, but a series of efforts both tactical and at the strategic level for communication to avoid these kinds of crises. >> i think the everywhere crisis coordination has improved in northeast asia is around north korea. and in particular, the dramatic improvement in 2013 in relations between china and south korea, i think really has taken a lot of broader risk out of the north korea crisis. the north korea crisis would
clearly be a big challenge for south korea, but i think the fear always was that the korean peninsula could really be a focal point for a broader international crisis. and i think that's really gone way, way down. >> jack wilson. >> hi, jack goldstone, george mason university and brookings. want to pick on something that david said. 2013 had a lot of crises, but nonetheless we saw quite a lot of resilience. despite the fact that debt ratios in europe went up for a lot of angle states, the euro crisis faded because of coordination and ecd. syria, the war got worse, but oil prices didn't spike because of the global process on fracking and the ability of the u.s. and russia to surprisingly
work together. so my question is, given what you said about crises and in particular spots coming forward, what do you see about the resilience and the institutions that if an international order to function well in response to them the next year? is nader getting stronger or weaker? is the u.s. pivoted asia really going to add security to that region? is viewin the u.n. going to be o intervene effectively in africa as problems pop up or some other agency going to step in? in other words, what do you see as the most effective global institution going forward? and are any of these threats potential risks to weaken or undermined the kind of responsibility, the response ability of these institutions be? that's a great question. i do believe, i do believe that we still have a very, very big institutional challenge.
and as everybody knows, we have talked about g-0 world. and again, it's not to say that there is no multilateralism and there are no institutions, that i think that this crisis that you begin to see in u.s. alliances very much an expression of g-0 world. i do believe, as i said, i think the region most, by far most vulnerable to this is the middle east, where i think what you're saying is an increasing role of regional action, of regional actors. and, frankly, a huge competition between the shia powers, iran and hezbollah, and the sunni powers, saudi arabia, the gulf states, turkey, again, who are very fragmented among
themselves, very, very fragmented among themselves. but i think that as i look at the ability of the world to engage your -- engage your from an institutional perspective, i think that on the crisis, prevention crisis response site, i'm quite pessimistic. i much less pessimistic on the international financial elements. but crisis response here, i think much more, much more challenging. and again, even in asia i think the sources of my optimism about security issues in asia is an institutionally driven. it's really much more structural and interest driven. so i'm a pessimist. i know some people on the panel
may have some different views on this. >> mark? >> unfortunately, on that regard i don't. the concern, for example, when you look at the u.n. peacekeeping response, and a good example now is -- they are polling, they had to pull troops out of other peacekeeping missions for central african republic, now they have to pull troops from other peacekeeping missions to do with a problem in south sudan, moving from 7000 up to 12,000 peacekeepers. simply, we don't have a good mechanism and we also don't have a good mechanism for ensuring that those troops are the right troops, trained, capable, not from the neighboring states of their own interest as we see in central african republic, chad. so that's a question there. the other is, and this is my hobby horse, the international system has failed utterly in 15 years to recognize the need to have effective law enforcement and justice sector support, and
for fragile states both for support public and post-conflict reconstruction. recently don't have it. and, finally, i would say that the regional organization, they still haven't quite developed capabilities to fill the gap. and we either need to recognize that, help them do it, or understand that you're going to have to have you in in a far more -- to have the u.n. and a far more capable, extended fork or skinny capability, it has to be done. and, finally, come of the one good piece of news is, is twofold. i think that the atrocity prevention board that the obama administration has started, finally in the case of central african republic, late, actually resulted in a far more expensive response over the course of the last month and have been would otherwise have been the case. and the u.n. has now developed something called rights forward,
where they are actually going to look at this issue of how do you prevent atrocities come and hopefully get serious about it in terms of staffing, resources. >> just quickly, i agree with david. there is i think an institutional deficit in key areas on really important issues, and i agree with mark, is also a capacity deficit in many areas, the resources of the u.n. are limited to deal with many of these conflicts. i think if there's some positive news in 2013, is that it's shown the value of the ad hoc coalition willing to actually resolve some crises. we saw that with iran, the p5+1 grouping, in at least getting this interim deal. we saw this over some extent the chemical weapons issue in syria. ..
mapping of the terrain for our panel. david, a quick follow-up, on the theme of diverging economies are concrete cases to involvement in emerging economies and the global value chain as a mitigating factor overall? i ask the question because the economist, this picks up on the theme of the anniversaries, 100 years from the anniversary of the first world war and the economist published a piece saying we ought to be a little more angst written about legacy conflict. john mccain -- and there was too much emphasis on economic independence but there is the global value change. are there specific cases you could back of to and if the panel wants to comment on the economist's concern?
>> i think the whole phenomenon of supply chain integration in asia, literally tens of millions of people being lifted out of poverty, hundreds of millions of people being lifted out of poverty in china, in indonesia, in india, yes is the answer to that. i remember doing a piece with my colleague linda lim from the university of michigan on wages in southeast asia and so-called race to the bottom hypophysis. empirically we are in exactly 180 degrees different world. it is not race to the bottom in wages at all in china, very
similar, phenomenon. i think it is a fair question, i don't want to overstate the point. i don't believe that economic integration is a panacea and it doesn't always work. the term i use was a mitigated ranted clearly is. in particular as i look at the middle east, part of the tragedy of what we used to call the arabs spring was you never really got full transitions that were able to put in place economic policies and programs to address these issues and it was that factors that was the major element behind the
deterioration and i know this is something that is very hard to influence from the outside. plenty of people were working on these issues, egypt, tunisia and it was a bear if conditions and political conditions in particular in the country's weren't enabling, didn't matter what the external community wanted to do or was willing to put money against. >> if you look at those countries, the bottom of human development index and match them with countries we talked about in terms of likelihood of additional conflict or three years, you find a pretty good overlap, particularly when you look at countries like the issue of income inequality has risen, there is again -- one of the most unequal countries in the
word--the world of intimate disparity and the failure to do what occurred in southeast asia, the failure to expand opportunity with respect to education, these are underlying strategic conditions that have an impact, not totally but have a significant impact on setting the stage in the future. >> one of the themes that cuts across all regions and the economic and political threat, grave concerns about unemployment. the population is over 7 billion people, desperation in immigration to europe, better resource nationalism because it will fail to produce employment, i wonder how vulnerable do you
think a retreat from global trade alliances, wto, return to resources that it -- nationalism, a wonder how big a concern you might see this unemployment and an ability to deliver jobs to you. >> my own view is you have a real challenge, a lot of the interest in the emerging markets in the last decade was driven by resources, particularly energy resources under the notion that we were in a world of sharp scarcity in energy resources. in fact, we are entering into a very different world in which
scarcity of assumptions are being challenged if not replaced, and if you look at who is vulnerable to that, it is front years and particularly those where resources nationalism continues to have a lot of salience, nigeria, a lot of these countries are actually going -- following what are likely to be self-defeating strategies, you are even seeing some of that in brazil, brazilians are more likely to cost correct that the end of the day, they understand the world, but there is a lot of vulnerability in the frontier markets, the emerging markets
particularly in africa. and to understand if the world is changing in a way that makes contact -- competition for what looks produced a much more salient issue. >> if you look at what are the factors that relate to the increase in armed groups in many of these countries, no one has effectively dealt with the issue, growing issue of youth unemployment and youth without skills and so you wind up, they are the ones recruited whether it is by the narcotics cartels or the militias in south sudan. if we don't figure out how to help countries deal with that problem and it is not just the question of macroeconomics either but targeted effort in
terms of education, skills and in terms of engagement to feel part of the society and so far we have not done a good job helping countries see that as a priority. >> to pick up on your deck about unemployment, many people were very concerned this time last year about the levels of unemployment in southern europe. in some cases the dog that didn't bark and a lot of people predicted that there would be mass demonstrations on the streets, 1968 all over again and much worse and it was that because of the changing demographic structure in europe to dampen that problem? was it government's support network, family support networks? probably those all played a role. as market implied in other parts
of the world where there are not those sort of safety nets, the threat is very real and those countries where the demographic structure or profile is not as favorable as it is in europe that is where the concern lies. >> one little plan. democracy is an interesting driver because even in moonshiner, what we have seen is that the level of growth needed to keep unemployment at what the chinese view as an acceptable level is coming down because of the combination of one child policy and the beginning of the transition away from rural to urban migration. demographics are highly varied
around the world. alan. >> formerly with the department of state, anticipated my question when he mentioned it europe, europe is not part of the global conflict tracker. given its importance to the united states, is there any development in europe? thinking primarily of southern europe but including france, maybe more in the economic and financial area but with possible spillover effect into the political arena that should be of concern to the united states. >> i think the main issue and it is a huge issue of concern to the united states is that i think europe is increasingly under fiscal pressures and in those fiscal pressures nato linked military issues
invariably get short shrift that if you summarize european defense spending you have a big number. if you look at the capabilities that that translates into because of the national orientation of all of the european countries it is a pretty small set of capabilities and the underpinnings frankly of the nato alliance as an active collaboration are becoming harder and harder to sustain. >> that is exactly right. our concern for the european union and nato as partners in helping to deal with these foreign policy challenges, that is where we see the greatest vulnerability. >> the biggest question about europe is its future role, certainly global security
manager provider and even in the immediate region around europe and we have seen less appetite among european public for any kind of activist foreign policy role with the possible exception of the french in africa but what most european countries are going to make this question what will europe will play in the future in managing many of these disputes. >> fred. >> thanks. the question i want to ask is as good as the school is and it gets better every year, is it adequate as a conflict prevention priority tool? does it flag the things that should be opportunities to
prevent some of these things. it is a great fool the shows where things may go in 2014 or could they get worse? it seems to have the orientation that is too much the case in most think tanks which is geographic. we need to understand american threats as country by country, local dynamics that produce conflicts and horrible consequences. it is not at all clear on this chart whether national interest is just about people killing each other in a mass number the location and importance of country. it turns into a plumbing exercise and loses all the architecture and that is what is going wrong in the world and american foreign policy. and not just the united nations. alliances are more regional and
local situations. and one of the problems with the ed snowden thing is it completely exposed this double standard in the united states about the interests of american citizens versus the interests of everybody else in the world. if we lose the impression that we are out there trying to advance an architecture for the world, that is in the interest of these other people, many of the realizing we are not, talk about soft power deterioration, we lose the influence to affect so many situations because people think we are just in it for our own era national interests. so somehow there needs to be an overlay that reflects the kinds of trends that lead to a tipping points that lead to deterioration that may not be in 2014 in terms of people killing each other in mass numbers but if you don't do certain things like the security sector capability much more effectively
addressed, throughout large parts of the world, things continue to slide. i love this discussion. i love this pool. it tells me where things are going to blow in 2014 but doesn't tell me what my opportunities are to make some of them less likely. >> one response? >> you make some very important points. our exercise does tend to desegregate the various crises and potential conflicts and particularly focused purely on geopolitical contingencies as the main focus and the result of that is you sometimes lose these complex interdependent sees between different contingencies, how one could trigger the other, the contagion effect through the system and it is difficult to captures that because they are inherently unpredictable and
even these relatively discreet crises are difficult to define and assess in any rigorous fashion. the large point is definitely correct. the survey should not be seen as a substitute for an assessment of one of the opportunities these conflicts present in terms of early conflict prevention or mitigation efforts and they don't provide precise guidance or strategies for dealing with many of these conflicts. our other products, preventive action tries to do that, we provide more explicit guidance how to manage these conflicts. they're very valuable expert briefs. we are trying to limit what this exercise can accomplish, we
don't want to overload it with too many excursions and get into policy prescription. >> can i make one comment? when is that is the beginning of my discussion, i talked about some of the trends the we see that cut across these individual conflicts and didn't try to say we should do x, y and z but those of the trends and including the question about youth unemployment you need to be thinking through as to what you do over the next 5 to 10 years in trying to help countries deal with them. the second is a reminder, we also have an interactive map. we produce this crisis watch every month, we have the mack, the distinction is when you go up those countries and will of the reports but it pulls out
those actions, recommendations we think need to be taken with respect to those issues. >> can i make one comment as of former policymaker, one of the most interesting observances that i had of this process, the prevention process, we were asked in the clinton administration, to look at opportunities as well, there was often a real disjuncture between where they appeared analytically to be opportunities to where there was political pressure, a push to engage, the latter tended to talk to the former so
you would not necessarily get the greatest engagement in those crises that looked as if they had the most opportunity for effective prevention. so this is a really complicated stuff and it is not all about what makes sense analytically. the politics of this is very substantial -- substantially driving these outcomes. >> that is why this atrocity prevention board is supposed to recognize that. even though this is not on the headlines it is coming down the road so you need to think about how to deal with that ahead of time but the bigger point is in this, 24 hours a day, those policymakers are dealing with what is on their plate that day and it is hard to come up with
additional hours to focus on what may be on their plate three years from now. >> it is a great conflict. georgetown university, it is agreed conflict, and we thank you all, if i put on my susan rice hat, asking the question, what are your criteria of importance here, and is a possibility we might use force which is implicit in europe in your matrix and more the issue of humanitarian cost, is that the number one criteria or is it a geopolitical impact in the macro global sense? how do we choose? because we have to choose, we
need priorities and what is the matrix of how you -- >> i will go back to my starting commons. and that is what america's allies are looking for, how are we going to choose? and the president's speech this year was all about iran, israel, palestine sent a very troubling message after we had this whole buildup about transition to asia and that is the question that is out there. is there a strategy, does the second obama administration have a strategic viewpoint that is
driving the behavior beyond one or two things they are focused on? i give the administration high grades for iran, doing a good job. we will see if it works. beyond that, i think that you have this whole level of uncertainty even in the middle east where the saudis, other gulf states, the israelis are uncertain what is america's vision about its role in that region, when the vice president went to tokyo a couple weeks ago, he thought he had good meetings, the people who he was meeting with didn't think so, and that is really the backdrop to the prime minister's visit
and increasing efforts in asia by asians to work out their own increasing defense architecture as a hedge on what happens if the united states really isn't there for us. that is the question. >> i would say that our concern is focused on what is likely to produce mass loss of human life. the difference from the past is we are arguing and in the united states we are beginning to accept that the united states in terms of its own national strategic interest has to be concerned about that as well. and failure to deal with that problem of atrocities will result in damage to u.s. national interests over not only the long term, the medium term. you cannot simply ignore rolando or south sudan or central
african republic. you have to react and you have to try to prevent those from getting worse and the same with respect to see real where we have yet to find an acceptable answer. >> as you say the principal criteria that we use for ranking the relative priority of different contingencies and u.s. interests focus and to what extent do these conflicts pose a direct risk to the lives of americans to the risk of u.s. military engagement that might flow from these conflicts to us. those conflicts deserve more priority than the other ones and the hard hearted about the humanitarian, and in terms of
relative priority, the ones where the interest of the united states and the livelihood of america are the ones deserving the highest priority. >> time for one final question and you have the opportunity. >> global witness national defense university. i want to ask about the architecture of conflict and crisis that came out earlier. two or three states, a lot of the power brokers in these locations have an incentive towards predatory behavior and conflict and have the disincentive to building institutions and all those things. aside from military intervention are you seeing a push towards using new tools to d incentivize those conflicts in those fragile state that keep coming up over and over again to change in that year